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Abstract
The predictive performance of any inferential model is critical to its practical suc-
cess, but quantifying predictive performance is a subtle statistical problem. In this
paper I show how the natural structure of any inferential problem defines a canonical
measure of relative predictive performance and then demonstrate how approximations
of this measure yield many of the model comparison techniques popular in statistics
and machine learning.
Because any inferential method is built upon assumptions, one of the most important
aspects of any statistical analysis is assessing the validity of the underlying assumptions.
Although there are few model assessment approaches that claim to validate a model in
isolation, there is a rich history of comparative techniques in the statistics literature, from
visual residual analyses to scoring rules and predictive cross validation to the myriad of
information criteria. The practical challenge in applying these methods, however, is in
determining the ultimate accuracy of their assessments and hence which might be most
appropriate to a given problem.
In this paper I demonstrate that any inferential system admits a canonical measure of
comparative predictive performance, here termed a relative predictive performance score.
Moreover, I show how many of the model comparison techniques in practice today arise
as approximations to these canonical scores. This foundational perspective provides a
common context for understanding the advantages and disadvantages of each technique
both in theory and in practice.
After reviewing the basic assumptions common to most inferential techniques, in partic-
ular the assumptions of frequentist and Bayesian inference, I demonstrate first how relative
predictive performance scores arise naturally from these assumptions and then how var-
ious approximations of these scores yield existing model comparison techniques. In the
latter I emphasize how this foundational construction immediately identifies the practical
consequences of each approximation.
1
1 Foundational Assumptions of Inference
The most fundamental assumption underlying any attempt at inference is the existence of
some latent data generating process, π, responsible for generating measurements. Formally
we assume that measurements are drawn from some measurable space, (Y,Y), and that the
data generating process itself can be modeled mathematically by a single, time-invariant
probability measure,
π : Y → [0, 1].
In order to make this construction as general as possible I impose no additional structure,
such as a particular topology or metric, on Y , nor make any philosophical interpretation
of this latent data generating process, in particular its interpretation as an ontological
truth or just an epistemological impression. Consequently the following results will hold
regardless of any deeper meaning of the measurement process itself.
Inference is then a formal effort to learn the latent data generating process given a
measurement, y ∈ Y , by identifying π from the space of all probability measures, P , on
the measurement space. Unfortunately, exploring the entirety of P for any problem is far
too unwieldly, and in order to construct practical inferential methods we first have to limit
ourselves to a more manageable space of data generating processes.
An inferential model is the selection of a distinguished subset of data generating pro-
cesses, X ⊂ P ; in the spirit of Dennis Lindley I refer to such subsets as small worlds [1]. As
with the latent data generating process, I am careful not to assign any particular meaning
to the small world – it can be a phenomenological model motivated by mathematical and
practical convenience, a theoretical model motivated by a specific scientific hypothesis, or,
as is most common in practice, a delicate combination of the two. In this paper I denote
the measure corresponding to a given element of the small world, x ∈ X, as
πx : Y → [0, 1].
One assumption that I have explicitly not made is that the chosen small world need
contain the latent data generating process (Figure 1). In particular, assuming that the
small world rarely, if ever, contains the latent data generation process formalizes the Box-
ian philosophy that “all models are wrong but some are useful” [2]. Although developments
in computation and theory, such as statistical nonparametrics, have enabled the construc-
tion of increasingly complex models and less-small worlds, the intricacy of any realistic
measurement should continue to inspire skepticism in the sufficiency of any small world.
From this perspective, the ultimate utility of any inferential procedure is not in whether
it can find the latent data generating process exactly but rather in how well it can approx-
imate the latent data generating process. In particular, the fidelity of a procedure is often
judged based on its predictive performance. Exactly how we define predictive performance
depends intimately on how inference is implemented, which itself depends on the funda-
mental interpretation of probability.
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Figure 1: Inference requires the selection of a distinguished subset of data generating
processes that (a) may or (b) may not contain the latent data generating process, π. The
Boxian philosophy asserts that the former is impossible in practical problems but that we
may still hope that some data generating process in X will well-approximate π.
2 Inference in the Small World
We have already assumed that probability theory adequately describes the measurement
process, but that does not have to be the only application of probability theory. While
frequentist inference limits probabilities to the data, Bayesian inference also endows the
small world with a probabilistic interpretation.
In the following sections I review the measure-theoretic construction of frequentist and
Bayesian inference. The formality is a necessary evil in order to identify the canonical mea-
sures of predictive performance that do not rely on the additional structure of a particular
measurement space.
2.1 Frequentist Inference
In frequentist inference [3, 4] probabilities are defined strictly as frequencies of repeatable
events, namely measurements. Consequently probability theory applies to only the latent
data generating process, π, and the data generating processes in the small world, {πx}.
Considered as a family of probability distribution functions on the measurement space, the
small world,
πx : X × Y → [0, 1] ,
is otherwise known as a likelihood function.
Given this rigid definition of probability, the only way we can construct a complete
predictive distribution is by selecting a single element of the small world and utilizing the
corresponding data generating process. One of the most prolific approaches to selecting
such an element is with the use of estimators, functions of the data that identify some
aspect of the latent data generating process. Formally, estimators are defined as maps
from the measurement space to some auxiliary space, eˆ : Y → Z.
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Given a set of estimators, E, we can quantify how well a given estimator identifies the
latent data generating process with a loss function,
L : Y × E → R.
The corresponding risk of an estimator is defined as
R :X × E → R
(x, eˆ) 7→
∫
Y
πx(dy)L(y, eˆ) ,
and minimax estimators are defined by the optimality criterion,
eˆM = argmin
eˆ∈E
max
x∈X
R(x, eˆ) .
With a map f : Z → X we can then select a single element of the small world and define
the subsequent predictive distribution for new data by
π˜Y |y ≡ πf(eˆM (y)).
For example, consider the circumstance where the small world contains the latent data
generation process,
π = xpi ∈ X,
and take any map g : X → Z with a well-defined inverse, g−1 : g(X)→ X. If Z is a metric
space then a natural loss function is given by the distance function,
L(y, eˆ) = D(g(xpi) , eˆ(y)) ;
the resulting minimax estimator, eˆM , approximates the true value of the function, g(xpi),
which then identifies a unique element of the small world,
xˆ = g−1 ◦ eˆM :Y → X
y 7→ g−1(eˆM (y)) .
Maximum likelihood estimators avoid the need for a loss function by using the likelihood
itself. Given any reference measure, λ, with respect to which every element of the small
world is absolutely continuous, the maximum likelihood estimator is defined as
xˆMLE :Y → X
y 7→ argmax
x∈X
dπx
dλ
(y) .
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Provided that the maximum is unique, xˆMLE identifies a unique element of the small world
and hence an unambiguous predictive distribution.
The practical utility of a frequentist estimator is a subtle issue. When the small world
does not contain the latent data generating process, for example, any predictive distribution
derived from an estimator will never be able to recover the latent data generating process
exactly. Moreover, even if the small world does contain the true data generating process
there is no guarantee that an estimator evaluated at a given measurement will identify it.
A given estimator may be unidentified and unable to select a single element of the small
world at all, or it may simply be inaccurate or imprecise. In any case we must be skeptical
of how well π˜Y |y approximates the latent data generating process.
2.2 Bayesian Inference
Bayesian inference [5, 6] considers a more general interpretation of probability that encom-
passes not just frequencies but any self-consistent system of uncertainty. Consequently we
can assign probability distributions to not only the measurement space but also the small
world itself given the choice of a σ-algebra, X , on X.
From this perspective, the small world now defines a regular conditional probability
distribution,
πY |x : Y ×X → [0, 1],
with respect to the canonical projection operator,
̟X : Y ×X → X,
on the product space of measurements and the small world, Y ×X. The difference between
this regular conditional probability distribution and the frequentist likelihood function is
largely one of interpretation and, following convention, I will refer to both objects as
likelihoods.
Inference proceeds with the introduction of a prior distribution over the small world,
πX : X → [0, 1],
that encodes all information about the latent data generating process within the context
of the small world before the current measurement is made. Together with the likelihood,
the prior distribution defines a joint distribution on the product space of measurements
and the small world, πY×X , and information about the small world given a measurement
is encoded in the regular conditional probability distribution,
πX|y : X × Y → [0, 1],
defined with respect to the second canonical projection operator,
̟Y : Y ×X → Y.
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Conditioning πX|y on a given measurement, y, gives the posterior distribution over the
small world,
πX|y =
[
dπY |x
d (̟Y )∗ πY×X
(y)
]
πX .
When Y ∼ X ∼ Rn, the posterior density with respect to a reference Lebesgue measure is
given by the celebrated Bayes’ Rule,
πX|y(x|y) =
πY |x(y|x)πX(x)∫
Rn
dxπY |x(y|x)πX(x)
.
Given the more general application of probability in Bayesian inference we can construct
a predictive distribution not only by selecting a single element of the small world but also by
averaging the elements of the small world with respect to a given probability distribution.
The prior predictive distribution, for example, is given by weighting each element of the
small world according to the prior distribution,
πpriorY (dy˜) =
∫
X
πX(dx)πY |x(dy˜, x) .
Similarly, the posterior predictive distribution is given by weighting each element of the
small world according to the posterior distribution,
πpostY |y (dy˜|y) =
∫
X
πX|y(dx|y)πY |X(dy˜|x) .
Because it learns from the measured data, the posterior predictive distribution should be
a better approximation of the latent data generating process provided that the modeling
assumptions, such as the choice of the small world and the prior distribution, are compatible
with the true data generating process.
As in frequentist inference, the performance of either predictive distribution depends
critically on the assumptions in their construction. Some means of comparing the chosen
predictive distribution to the latent data generating process is vital for validating the
modeling assumptions and ensuring inferences that perform well in practice.
3 Validating Inference
Although the frequentist and Bayesian approaches have different means of inferring predic-
tive distributions, they can both succumb to the same pathologies that jeopardize predictive
performance.
The most obvious pathology is model misfit where the true data generating process is
not contained within the small world, π /∈ X, and any inferential method will be able to
approximate the exact predictive distribution only so well (Figure 2). Even if the small
6
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Figure 2: Because (a) frequentist estimators and (b) Bayesian prior and posterior distribu-
tions are limited to the small world, neither approach will be able to construct a predictive
distribution capable of exactly modeling the latent data generating process, π, when it is
not an element of the small world.
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Figure 3: Even when the small world does contain the latent data generating process, π,
inferences are not guaranteed to capture it. Here (a) a frequentist estimator evaluated at
a given measurement strays from π while (b) a Bayesian prior or posterior distribution
concentrates away from π. In either case the predictive distributions will be biased away
from the latent data generating process.
world contains the latent data generating process, however, inferences still may not be able
to find it because they overfit to irrelevant structure in the measurement, such as purely
stochastic noise (Figure 3). In practice these two pathologies are somewhat antagonistic –
making a model more complex in order to reduce misfit often renders it more vulnerable
to noise and hence subject to overfitting.
Consider, for example, the measurement space Y = (R× R)N=12 with two data gener-
ating processes: a Gaussian distribution centered on a quartic polynomial
y1,n ∼ U(−1, 1) , y2,n|y1,n ∼ N
(
4∑
k=0
cky
k
1,n, σ
2
)
, n = 1, . . . , 12, (1)
and a Gaussian distribution centered on a constant,
y1,n ∼ U(−1, 1) , y2,n ∼ N
(
c0, σ
2
)
, n = 1, . . . , 12. (2)
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Figure 4: Misfit occurs when an inferential model cannot capture the complexity of the
latent data generating process, for example when models assuming the simple data gen-
erating process (2) are fit to (a) data generated according to the more complex process
(1). Because the assumptions are too restrictive, the resulting (b) maximum likelihood
predictive distribution and (c) posterior predictive distribution are poor approximations to
the latent data generating process. Compare to Figure 2.
Misfit occurs when the measurement is generated from the more complex process (1) (Fig-
ure 4a) but the inferential models assume the simpler process (2); in this case the resulting
predictive distributions (Figure 4b, c) will never be able to capture the latent data gen-
erating process. On the other hand, overfit occurs when the measurement is generating
from the simpler process (Figure 5a) but the inferential models assume the more complex
process. The resulting predictive distributions (Figure 5b, c) will overfit to the Gaussian
noise, inducing a bias away from the latent data generating process. In both cases the
Bayesian analysis uses the conjugate prior
πX(c, σ) = MultiNormalGamma(µ0,Λ0, α0, β0)
with
µ0 = 0
Λ0 = 0.001 · I
α0 = 0.5
β0 = 0.5.
Reliable inferences consequently require some predictive validation to ensure that, even
if the model misfits or overfits, the resulting predictive distribution approximates the latent
data generating process sufficiently well. One immediate strategy is to test the model
within a null hypothesis significance testing framework, rejecting if the measured data is
sufficiently unlikely with respect to the inferred predictive distribution. By construction,
however, we make no attempt to model anything outside of the small world, let alone
its entire complement, which prevents us from constructing a valid alternative hypothesis
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Figure 5: Overfitting occurs when an inferential model has too much flexibility relative
to the latent data generating process, for example when models assuming a complex data
generating process (1) are fit to (a) data generating according to the simpler data generating
process (2). Both the (b) maximum likelihood predictive distribution and (c) posterior
predictive distribution recklessly fit to the Gaussian noise in the data, biasing predictions
away from the latent data generating process. Compare to Figure 3.
needed to calibrate such tests. In order to quantify predictive performance without looking
outside of the small world we need to compare the predictive distribution to the latent data
generating process directly.
[7] considered many possible strategies for comparing predictive distributions to the
latent data generating process, but almost all of them require endowing the small world
with additional structure, such as a metric or a distinguished test function, that limits the
ultimate scope of the validation. Only one of the approaches considered arises canonically
from the general construction of inference – the Kullback-Leibler divergence [8]. In this
section I discuss how the Kullback-Leibler divergence defines a measure of relative predic-
tive performance, although one that cannot be computed in practice. I then consider a
manipulation of the Kullback-Leibler divergence that defines scores of relative predictive
performance that are amenable to approximations, and finally I show how various approx-
imation strategies give rise to many of the model comparison techniques already popular
in practice.
3.1 Relative Predictive Performance Measures
In order to construct a measure of predictive performance we have to compare some inferred
predictive distribution, π˜Y |y, to the latent data generating process, π. Without endowing
the measurement space with any particular structure, the only canonical way of comparing
two distributions, µ and ν, on Y is with an f -divergence [9],
Df (µ || ν) =
∫
Y
ν(dy) f
(
dµ
dν
(y)
)
,
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where f : R → R is any convex function satisfying f(1) = 0. Moreover, the only f -
divergence that respects any product structure of the measurement space and allows us to
marginalize out irrelevant structure as necessary is the Kullback-Leibler divergence,
KL(µ || ν) = −
∫
Y
µ(dx) log
dν
dµ
(x) .
The Kullback-Leibler divergence vanishes only when the two measures are equal and
monotonically increases as the two measures deviate, approaching infinity when ν is not
absolutely-continuous with respect to µ.
Because the Kullback-Leibler divergence is not symmetric there are two possible ways
that we might use it to compare the latent data generating process and an inferred
predictive distribution. Using the inferred predictive distribution as the base measure,
KL
(
π˜Y |y || π
)
, considers the predictive performance only where π˜Y |y concentrates and con-
sequently does not penalize predictive distributions that completely ignore neighborhoods
supported by π. In an extreme limit, this divergence does not even penalize predictive
distributions that are not absolutely continuous with respect to the latent data generating
process. In order to truly assess the inferred predictive distribution we need to instead
base the divergence on the latent data generating process itself,
KL
(
π || π˜Y |y
)
= −
∫
Y
π(dy˜) log
dπ˜Y |y
dπ
(y˜) .
Here we will use this form of the Kullback-Leibler divergence to quantify the validity of our
modeling assumptions, but it can also be used to construct a more elaborate sensitivity
analysis of those assumptions [10].
As with null hypothesis significance testing, the Kullback-Leibler divergence cannot be
calibrated, in other words there is no canonical threshold below which we can declare our
model assumptions valid. Unlike hypothesis testing, however, the difference between two
divergences is meaningful, allowing us to quantify the relative performance of π˜Y |y com-
pared to some other predictive distribution. Although KL
(
π || π˜Y |y
)
cannot be computed
without assuming a priori knowledge of the true data generation process, we can manipu-
late the divergence into a more advantageous form without compromising its quantification
of relative performance.
Let λ be any reference measure with respect to which both the true data generating
process and the inferred predictive distribution are absolutely continuous. We can then
define a relative predictive performance score as
δ
(
π || π˜Y |y
)
= KL
(
π || π˜Y |y
)
−KL(π || λ) (3)
= −
∫
Y
π(dy˜) log
dπ˜Y |y
dλ
(y˜)
= −Epi
[
log
dπ˜Y |y
dλ
]
.
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The difference between any relative predictive performance scores is the same as the differ-
ence of the equivalent Kullback-Leibler divergences and so they quantify the same relative
performance, but because the densities dπ˜Y |y/dλ are independent of the latent data gener-
ating process these relative scores can be approximated using only sampled measurements
from π. Relative predictive performance scores also have the welcome interpretation as
expected logarithmic score functions [11, 5].
The ultimate utility of these relative predictive performance scores then depends on
the accuracy and precision of the chosen approximation strategy.
3.2 Approximating Relative Predictive Performance Scores
Although relative predictive performance scores cannot be calculated exactly, their con-
struction makes them amenable to a variety of approximations. For example, given an
ensemble of N + 1 measurements we could construct a Monte Carlo estimator,
δˆ
(
π || π˜Y |y
)
≈ −
1
N
N∑
n=1
log
dπ˜Y |yN+1
dλ
(yn) ,
with vanishing bias and quantifiable variance. Unfortunately, in practice we rarely have an
ensemble of measurements and instead have to consider approximations that utilize only a
single measurement.
3.2.1 Delta Estimators
An immediate approximation of relative predictive performance scores derives from making
a delta approximation of the latent data generating process, π ≈ δy, which gives
δˆD
(
π || π˜Y |y
)
≡ − log
dπ˜Y |y
dλ
(y) .
Using the same measurement to learn the model and then validate it introduces a
bias that makes delta estimators susceptible to overfitting. Moreover, the underlying delta
approximation typically induces a large variance in the estimator, making fine comparisons
between models difficult if not impossible.
3.2.2 Hold-out Estimators
More sophisticated estimates of relative predictive performance scores can be constructed
by using the given measurement to simulate an ensemble of measurements.
Assuming that the measurement space has a product structure, Y =
∏N
n=1 Yn, any
measurement can be partitioned in two subsets of size N1 and N2. Hold-out estimators use
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one of these partitions, often denoted the training data, to infer a predictive distribution
and the remaining partition, denoted the validation data, to construct a delta estimator,
δˆH
(
π || π˜Y |y
)
≡ − log
(
dπ˜Y |y1
dλ
(y2)
)N/N2
= −
N
N2
log
dπ˜Y |y1
dλ
(y2) .
The simulated partitions in the validation data not only promise a more precise estimate
but also admit the estimation of the estimator variance using the Monte Carlo standard
error. This, however, comes with the assumption the naive scaling of the predictive den-
sity inferred from the training data is a reasonable approximation to the predictive density
inferred from the full measurement. When data are sparse relative to the model complex-
ity this assumption can severely bias the estimator; for example, predictive distributions
inferred from small partitions are more susceptible to overfitting, artificially penalizing the
predictive performance of model.
Moreover, the product structure of the measurement space necessary to construct hold-
out estimators precludes many structured measurements, such as those arising from some
hierarchical models, networks, and time series.
3.2.3 Jackknife Estimators
In order to compensate for the some of the potential bias in hold-out estimators we can
appeal to a jackknife estimator [12] which averages over the possible assignments of training
and validation data. Partitioning the measurement into K subsets of size M = N/K, the
jackknife estimator is given by
δˆJ
(
π || π˜Y |y
)
≡
1
K
K∑
k=1
− log
(
dπ˜Y |y\yk
dλ
(yk)
) N
M
=
1
K
K∑
k=1
− log
(
dπ˜Y |y\yk
dλ
(yk)
)K
= −
K∑
k=1
log
dπ˜Y |y\yk
dλ
(yk) ,
where y \ yk are often denoted the kth training data and yk the kth testing data. This ap-
proach can also be readily generalized to a bootstrap estimator [13] which samples training
and validation data with replacement.
The averaging over partitions typically reduces the bias of the relative predictive per-
formance score estimation but the variance can still be quite large. Moreover, the K fits
required to construct the jackknife estimator can be prohibitively expensive in practice.
12
3.3 Constructing Relative Predictive Performance Measures
When we apply these approximation strategies to the predictive distributions arising in
frequentist and Bayesian inference we immediately recover many of the comparative meth-
ods that have arisen and proved empirically effective in statistical practice. In this section
I detail many of these methods to emphasize the unifying nature of this foundational per-
spective.
3.3.1 Comparing Likelihoods
In frequentist methods the inferred predictive distribution is given by a single element in
the small world or, equivalently, evaluating the likelihood at a single point.
Explicit use of delta estimators of likelihood-based relative predictive performance
scores provide a formal justification of the visual residual analysis [14, 15] ubiquitous in
not only statistics but also the physical sciences. Moreover, when augmented with an ap-
propriate complexity penalty the the reuse estimator reduces to the Akaike Information
Criterion [16].
Hold-out and jackknife estimators of likelihood-based relative predictive performance
scores immediately yields predictive log loss hold-out validation and cross validation, re-
spectively, which have become almost fundamental principles in the practice of modern
machine learning [17, 18].
The potential pathologies of these approximations manifest even in the simple misfit
and overfit examples introduced above. I generate an ensemble of data from the latent data
generating process and compare the exact likelihood predictive performance score based on
a reference Lebesgue measure, δ, to each estimate, δˆ (Figures 6, 7). The partitions for the
hold-out estimators consisted of six data each, the minimum required for finite maximum
likelihood estimates, while the K = 6 jackknife partitions each consisting of N −M = 10
training data and M = 2 testing data.
In both cases the estimators are noisy with a substantial bias, with the hold-out esti-
mator particularly sensitive to overfitting as expected. Although these errors may partially
cancel when comparing models, any significant cancellation would be rather serendipitous.
3.3.2 Comparing Prior Predictive Distributions
Box [19, 20] was a strong proponent of the predictive validation of Bayesian methods, in
particular the use of the prior predictive distribution.
One benefit of the prior predictive distribution is that, because it doesn’t depend on
the measurement, the delta estimator is unbiased. In fact, the delta estimate
δD
(
π || πpriorY
)
≈ − log
dπpriorY
dλ
(y) ,
13
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Figure 6: Even in the simple misfit model, approximations of likelihood-based relative
predictive performance scores can leave much to be desired, as demonstrated by the 20%,
50%, and 80% quantiles of the estimator error over an ensemble of measurements from the
latent data generating process.
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Figure 7: The simple overfit model also exposes the weakness of approximations of
likelihood-based relative predictive performance scores can leave much to be desired, as
demonstrated by the 20%, 50%, and 80% quantiles of the estimator error over an ensem-
ble of measurements from the latent data generating process. Hold-out estimators are
particularly poor given how sensitive the hold-out fits are to overfitting.
14
-15
-10
-5
 0
 5
 10
 15
Delta Hold-out Jackknife
ˆ δ(y
) -
 δ(
y)
Prior Predictive Performance (Misfit)
(a)
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
Delta Hold-out Jackknife
(ˆ δ(
y) 
- δ
(y)
) /
 δ(
y)
Prior Predictive Performance (Misfit)
(b)
Figure 8: Approximations of prior predictive-based relative predictive performance scores
for the misfit are not terrible, as demonstrated by the 20%, 50%, and 80% quantiles of the
estimator error over an ensemble of measurements from the latent data generating process,
but nowhere near precise enough to compare models with similar predictive performance.
is exactly the logarithm of the marginal likelihood, or evidence, used in Bayesian model
comparison [21, 5], and the difference of estimates between two models is exactly the log-
odds ratio. Consequently classical Bayesian model comparison also has an interpretation
in terms of predictive performance.
That said, the utility of this relative predictive performance score is limited both by the
large variance of the estimator and a potential overfitting bias if the prior is modified during
inference. In models where the prior is strongly constrained by previous measurements or
theoretical conditions this bias may be less of an issue, but care should always be taken.
As in Section 3.3.1, the simple misfit and overfit examples demonstrate the limitations
of each estimator (Figures 8, 9).
3.3.3 Comparing Posterior Predictive Distributions
Alternatively, we can construct relative predictive performance scores in the Bayesian
paradigm by using the posterior predictive distribution.
Similar to the use of likelihoods, relative predictive performance scores constructed
from reuse estimators provide motivation for many visual diagnostics such as Bayesian
residual analyses [22] and, in particular, posterior-predictive checks [23, 24]. Likewise,
the use of hold-out and jackknife estimators yields posterior predictive hold-out and cross
validation, [25, 26], which continues to grow in popularity in the machine learning and
statistics literature. Consideration of the example of Section 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 emphasizes
the continued need to maintain vigilance in these applications (Figures 10, 11).
Posterior predictive cross validation also provides the basis for unifying many of the in-
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Figure 9: The bootstrap estimator of prior predictive-based relative predictive performance
scores is particularly sensitive to overfitting, as seen in the 20%, 50%, and 80% quantiles
of the estimator error over an ensemble of measurements from the latent data generating
process.
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Figure 10: Approximations of posterior predictive-based relative predictive performance
scores on the misfit example perform similarly to the approximations from other predic-
tive distributions, once again demonstrated by the 20%, 50%, and 80% quantiles of the
estimator error over an ensemble of measurements from the latent data generating process.
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Figure 11: Approximations of posterior predictive-based relative predictive performance
scores on the overfit example perform similarly to the approximations from other predic-
tive distributions, once again demonstrated by the 20%, 50%, and 80% quantiles of the
estimator error over an ensemble of measurements from the latent data generating process.
formation criteria that have been developed in the Bayesian literature. [7, 27], for example,
show how the Widely Applicable Information Criterion [28],
WAIC ∝
N∑
n=1
logEx
[
πY |x(yn|x)
]
−
N∑
n=1
Varx
[
log πY |x(yn|x)
]
,
can be derived as an approximation of the posterior predictive relative predictive perfor-
mance score. Moreover, given a point estimate, xˆ, that singles out one element of the small
world, the Widely Applicable Information Criterion reduces to the Deviance Information
Criterion [29],
DIC ∝
N∑
n=1
log πY |x(yn|xˆ)− 2
N∑
n=1
(
log πY |x(yn|xˆ)− Ex
[
log πY |x(yn|xˆ)
])
.
As with the reuse, hold-out, and jackknife estimators, the ultimate accuracy and precision
of these information criteria relative to the true posterior predictive relative predictive
performance score is paramount in any partial application.
4 Conclusion
In this paper I have shown how the Kullback-Leibler divergence between an inferred pre-
dictive distribution and the latent data generating process defines a canonical but incom-
putable measure of relative predictive performance. Moreover, I have demonstrated how it
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can be simplified into relative predictive performance scores which quantify the same rel-
ative predictive performance while also being more amenable to practical approximations.
Applying various approximation strategies to the relative predictive performance derived
from predictive distributions in frequentist and Bayesian inference yields many of the model
comparison techniques ubiquitous in practice, from predictive log loss cross validation to
the Bayesian evidence and Bayesian information criteria.
The main benefit in unifying all of these existing methods into a single foundational
perspective is that it provides a common framework for understanding the limitations of
these methods and how they can be used responsibly. In particular, it emphasizes that
these existing methods are all estimates, with uncertain variances and biases that make
quantitive statements about relative predictive performance, and a hard selection of one
model above all others under consideration, somewhat precarious.
This difficulty in making quantitative statements has motivated new approaches to
model comparison that do not fit each model in isolation but rather fit them as compo-
nents of a single, comprehensive model [30, 31]. Such an inclusive strategy offers unique
computational benefits and an intriguing new interpretation of the small world, and it
promises to be an exciting area of future research.
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